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Chapter 8 
 
Tactics for Internal Compliance:  
A Literature Review 
Compliance of organizations with internal and external norms is a 
highly relevant topic for both practitioners and academics nowadays. 
However, the substantive, elementary compliance tactics that organi-
zations can use for achieving internal compliance have been described 
in a fragmented manner and in the literatures of distinct academic 
disciplines. Using a multidisciplinary structured literature review of 
134 publications, this study offers three contributions. First, we present 
a typology of 45 compliance tactics, which constitutes a comprehensive 
and rich overview of elementary ways for bringing the organization 
into compliance. Secondly, we provide an overview of fundamental 
concepts in the theory of compliance, which forms the basis for the 
framework we developed for positioning compliance tactics and for 
analyzing or developing compliance strategies. Thirdly, we present 
insights for moving from compliance tactics to compliance strategies. 
In the process, and using the multidisciplinary literature review to take 
a bird’s-eye view, we demonstrate that compliance strategies need to 
be regarded as a richer concept than perceived hitherto. We also show 
that opportunities for innovation exist.
1
  
8.1 Introduction 
With the advent of stricter legal demands, industrial best practices, security 
concerns, ethical codes of conduct and IT management standards, the topic of 
internal compliance has become highly relevant for both practitioners and 
                                              
1 A preliminary version of the framework has been published as: Foorthuis, R.M., Bos, R. (2011). 
A Framework for Organizational Compliance Management Tactics. In: GRCIS 2011 (CAiSE 
2011 Workshop), LNBIP 83, pp. 259–268. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. The typology of tactics and 
the guidelines for developing compliance strategies have been submitted to a journal.  
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academics (MacLean and Behnam, 2010; Short and Toffel, 2010; OCEG, 2009; 
Cleven and Winter, 2009; Schneiberg and Bartley, 2008; Harris and Cummings, 
2007; Tyler and Blader, 2005; Emmerich et al., 1999). Simply put, internal 
compliance aims at ensuring that organizational actors’ behaviors and outputs 
conform to the norms (see also 8.3.1). This form of compliance can relate to 
various types and levels of prescriptive systems that guide and constrain 
organizations. International and domestic laws and regulations, industry-wide 
standards and best practices, and organizational guidelines, rules and procedures 
all require organizational actors to conform to norms. Different types of 
prescriptive systems have different raisons d’être. Laws and regulations are 
mostly concerned with mitigating societal risk and encouraging ethical behavior 
(MacLean and Behnam, 2010; Sadiq and Indulska, 2008). Industrial best 
practices and organizational procedures usually aim at mitigating organizational 
risk, improving competence, effectiveness and efficiency, and achieving 
compliance as an end in itself (Szulanski, 1996; O’Dell and Grayson, 1998; 
COSO, 1994). Business and IT management standards, such as Enterprise 
Architecture principles, mainly focus on achieving organization-wide business 
goals, alignment, integration, complexity control and agility (Lankhorst et al., 
2005; Gregor et al., 2007; Boh and Yellin, 2007).
2
 
The topic of compliance has fascinated scholars for centuries. As early as the 
1600s, Thomas Hobbes touched on the delicate issue of the compliance problem 
(Gauthier, 1991; Hollis, 1994; Hartman, 1996). He stated that, although 
compliance with ‘contracts’ may be better for the group as a whole and it may 
be in an individual actor’s best interest to agree to contracts, it may very well 
not be in his interest to actually comply with them. Following this logic, it is 
necessary for internal regulators to actively pursue and assess compliance. This 
is also true in an organizational context, as compliance with the norms may be 
in the best interest of the organization as a whole, but may not lead to optimal 
results from the perspective of complying individuals, projects or departments. 
This is not merely a philosophical stance, given the scandals society has seen at 
organizations such as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat (Kump and Rose, 2004; 
El Kharbili et al., 2008; MacLean and Behnam, 2010). Moreover, several 
studies demonstrate that non-compliance in organizations is widespread (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Healy and Iles, 2002; Malloy, 2003; Tyler and Blader, 2005). 
This makes compliance a strategic issue in the current era, especially considering 
the high financial and non-financial costs organizations have to pay for their 
                                              
2  Note that, although the previous chapters of this doctoral thesis focus on compliance with 
Enterprise Architecture, this chapter investigates compliance in general. 
Tactics for Internal Compliance: A Literature Review 
 
155 
 
non-compliance. With regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, transgressing 
organizations and individual CEOs and CIOs face severe penalties, such as fines 
and imprisonment (Volonino et al., 2004; Braganza and Franken, 2007). Scandals 
and unethical firm behavior can also severely damage an organization’s reputa-
tion due to dissatisfied customers, shareholders, employees and other stakehol-
ders (Philippe and Durand, 2011; Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2003; Harris and 
Cummings, 2007). Demonstrating compliance with regulations, industrial best 
practices and ethical norms, on the other hand, can yield not only legitimacy, 
but also a good reputation and the benefits that come with that, such as 
attracting large institutional investors and customers (ibid., Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Emmerich et al, 1999; Malloy, 2003; Currie, 2008; El Kharbili et al., 
2008). 
Organizations experience difficulties, however, in implementing their com-
pliance management approaches (Hurley, 2004; Sadiq and Indulska, 2008; Mac-
Lean and Behnam, 2010), possibly due to a lack of awareness of the full spectrum 
of actions that can be taken (cf. Straub and Welke, 1998). At the same time, both 
the compliance stimulating tactics (i.e. compliance techniques such as training 
and penalties) that comprise these approaches and the concept of compliance 
itself have been described in the extant literature in a fragmented manner and 
from very different perspectives. Consequently, there is the need for a structured 
overview of generic ways for encouraging compliance (cf. Cleven and Winter, 
2009). This chapter therefore aims to answer the following research question:  
 
What compliance tactics can be used by an organization to increase, 
achieve or maintain compliance with internal and external norms?  
 
A structured overview of such techniques, aiming to be as complete as 
possible and drawing upon multiple disciplines, has to the best of our 
knowledge not been published before. We will present the inventory of 45 
generic compliance tactics as a typology, based on a multidisciplinary literature 
review of 134 publications. This chapter will also deliver two additional sup-
porting contributions. First, we present an overview of fundamental insights into 
compliance. Along with definitions of key concepts, this will provide the basis 
for a conceptual structure or framework that can be used as an analytical tool for 
classifying, studying and presenting existing compliance-stimulating tactics. 
This structure will therefore be used for creating the typology of compliance 
tactics. In a process of ‘picking and choosing’ from the typology, such tactics 
form the fundamental elements of a broader compliance strategy. Therefore, as 
a second additional contribution, we will present a discussion on how internal 
regulators can use the typology to develop an overall and coherent organi-
zational compliance management strategy. In addition to this practical purpose 
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underlying our study, the classic and state-of-the-art insights presented in this 
chapter serve as an introduction to the topic of compliance for newcomers. 
Academics and practitioners already acquainted with the field may find that this 
chapter broadens their horizons.  
It is important to note that the focus of this study is on internal compliance, 
i.e. organizational compliance. The organization is not a black-box in this study. 
Our perspective is not that of governments and other societal institutions, but 
that of an organization’s internal regulators – such as senior managers, policy 
drafters and compliance officers – aiming at a compliant organization. The 
organization-wide policies and norms are created and implemented by these 
regulators. However, the organization does not operate in a vacuum and named 
creation and implementation processes are driven largely by external pressures 
from governments, competitors, customers, suppliers, partners and institutions 
such as NGOs and labor unions (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2003; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Currie, 2008; Short and Toffel, 2010; Weaver, Trevino 
and Cochran, 1999a; Ward and Peppard, 2002). Figure 8.1 shows the organiza-
tion, its internal actors and typical pressures exerted by external stakeholders. 
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Figure 8.1. The organization and its normative environment 
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After determining and interpreting the relevant pressures and translating 
them into internal policies, the various organizational units, projects, programs 
– and the individuals of which they are comprised – are expected to conform to 
them. Although organizations have been known to adopt symbolic compliance 
measures instead of substantively changing their operations (MacLean and 
Behnam, 2010; Short and Stoffel, 2010; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), we focus 
here on organizations that genuinely strive to be compliant. It is here that the 
underlying goal of this chapter lies, as we investigate what tactics an orga-
nization has at its disposal for achieving a satisfactory level of compliance.  
A concept commonly used when discussing compliance measures taken by 
an organization is that of internal controls. An internal control is usually 
defined as a formal process designed to provide reasonable assurance of 
achieving effective and efficient operations, reliable (financial) reporting, and 
compliance with laws and regulations (COSO, 1994; Luthy and Forcht, 2006; 
Namiri and Stojanovic, 2007). However, in this study we will introduce the 
concept of compliance tactic instead, which we define as a measure that can be 
taken, or a technique or mechanism that can be used, to encourage compliance 
of relevant organizational actors. The concept of tactics allows us to identify the 
theoretical essence of compliance endeavors rather than their practical 
implementation. See section 8.3 for more on this.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 8.2, our research approach is 
described. Section 8.3 defines and discusses fundamental compliance concepts. 
Section 8.4 introduces the conceptual structure and typology. Section 8.5 
presents a detailed description of the typology’s compliance tactics. Section 8.6 
discusses findings of the literature review and presents insights for developing a 
compliance management strategy. Section 8.7 is for conclusions. 
8.2 Research approach 
We employed a structured literature study for our research, as this provides an 
appropriate method to investigate the fundamentals of compliance and enables 
us to identify the wide array of techniques devised in distinct disciplines. 
Science can benefit from drawing from different fields, as a topic can be 
enriched by the exposure to distinct and potentially relevant theoretical 
backgrounds (cf. Webster and Watson, 2002; Malone and Crowston, 1994). The 
disciplines we have drawn upon are those of management and business studies 
(e.g. corporate compliance and ethics programs), law and political science (e.g. 
environmental agreements and determinants of compliance), information 
systems (e.g. security policies and informational privacy), philosophy (e.g. 
business and contractarian ethics), organizational sociology (e.g. institutional 
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factors), economics and accounting (e.g. compliance audits), engineering (e.g. 
technology for data protection), and social psychology (e.g. influence 
mechanisms).  
Based on Tranfield et al. (2003) and Brereton et al. (2007), we have 
structured our literature study as follows. In the first phase, the research project 
was planned. This entailed specifying initial research questions, gathering 
knowledge on methodological aspects of literature reviews, and specifying 
search criteria for identifying relevant publications. Since the identification of 
compliance tactics would be a crucial part of the study, we concluded that 
publications should be searched for in several academic disciplines. In addition, 
as the nature of the study was less a ‘truth finding’ mission than a broad and 
open-minded identification effort, quality criteria for journals and conferences 
could not be too strict (i.e. limiting the reviewed publications to only a handful 
of the fields’ top journals was not an option). Nonetheless, the norm was that a 
publication be academically peer reviewed, unless a technical report or 
practitioner publication yielded a significant insight.  
In the second phase, potentially relevant literature was identified and 
collected. Key search terms were “compliance”, “conformance” and “confor-
mity”. Other terms used were “compliance strategy”, “compliance manage-
ment”, “compliance policy”, “compliance auditing”, “corporate compliance” 
and “organi[z|s]ational compliance”. The search was conducted in academic 
indexing services, such as JSTOR, EconPapers and PiCarta, in broader listings 
such as GoogleScholar, and in search engines of specific journals. Title, 
abstract, keywords and occasionally conclusions informed the decision of 
whether or not to include the paper in the set of candidate publications. The 
literature was collected by the principal researcher and an information specialist 
of Statistics Netherlands’ library. All in all, over 200 (mostly digital) publi-
cations were collected in this phase. 
In the third phase, a literature database was created for systematic storage of 
publication characteristics to be gathered during the actual review process 
undertaken in the fourth phase. The database was based on the concept matrix 
of Webster and Watson (2002) and data extraction guidelines of Tranfield et al. 
(2003) and Kitchenham et al. (2009). It allowed storage of information such as 
the publication’s title, authors, unit of analysis and substantive conceptual 
contribution. In addition, a review protocol was established to ensure that the 
review process would be carried out in a systematic fashion (see Appendix 8.A). 
The protocol contained the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the definitive 
selection of publications, the steps of the review process, additional conditions, 
definitions and data extraction guidelines (cf. Brereton et al., 2007). In addition, 
several publications were studied or roughly scanned in this phase, both to 
obtain fundamental insights and to identify promising additional references. A 
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preliminary version of the analytical structure was created, as this would 
function as the two-dimensional framework in which the tactics would be 
positioned. In order to prevent leaving the reader with only a set of fragmented 
tactics, the research goal was also complemented with the sub-goal regarding 
the development of compliance strategies.  
In the fourth phase, the actual reviewing of the collected publications was 
conducted, i.e. identifying the compliance tactics and gathering insights into 
compliance strategies. Each decision to review a specific publication was based 
on the likelihood that it provided a new tactic or deeper insights into strategies 
or known tactics. A total of 134 publications was reviewed (excluding 
methodological and peripheral articles). See Tables 8.1 to 8.4 for an overview. 
The reviewing process was conducted by the principal author. Journal articles 
and conference papers were reviewed fully, whereas of books only the relevant 
sections were analyzed. After reviewing a publication, a descriptive record was 
added to the literature database (see Appendix 8.B for several examples). The 
identified compliance tactics, if any, were paraphrased and added to the 
preliminary tactics overview. Subsequently, the text in this document was 
iteratively coded to develop the typology of tactics (see section 8.4 for a 
definition of typologies). We used the method of Miles and Huberman (1994) 
for this coding process, as it aims at creating a classification or typology (in 
contrast to Grounded Theory, in which codes are developed to create a causal 
theory). A code in our study represented a (candidate) tactic. Two kinds of 
coding processes were used in the study. First-level coding, working mainly on 
the source text, is the process of creating summarized pieces of data and their 
respective codes. The first-level coding activities resulted in the creation of a 
preliminary classification of tactics. After 35 publications had been reviewed 
and coded in this manner, an iterative and creative process of pattern coding 
was initialized to run parallel with the continuing review and first-level coding 
activities, resulting in a more mature set of tactics. Pattern codes are descriptive 
pieces of data and their respective codes, representing patterns found in the 
underlying publications. Based on the first-codes, they evolved into the final 
versions of the compliance tactics presented in section 8.5. In the process, first-
level codes could be split up into several pattern codes, or they could be 
combined into a single pattern code (see Appendix 8.C for an overview of splits 
and combinations). This was due in part to the fact that the first-level codes 
were based more directly on the underlying individual publications, whereas the 
pattern coding was aimed at generalizing the tactics across all publications. Part 
of the latter process was also to position the tactics within the analytical 
structure (the two-dimensional framework presented in section 8.4). Important 
criteria for defining a definitive (pattern code) tactic were mutual exclusiveness 
and a conceptual abstraction that allowed for a clear and presentable descrip-
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tion. The framework was also finalized during this phase, after going through 
several iterations. Furthermore, knowledge on compliance management and 
strategies (presented in section 8.6) was gathered in this phase, as part of the 
review process.  
The fifth phase was writing the review report, which culminated in this 
chapter. An initial and short version was presented as a paper at an international 
workshop on compliance in order to obtain feedback. 
 
 
Discipline 
Number of 
publications 
Management and Business 34 
Law and Political Science 19 
Information Systems 30 
Philosophy and Sociology 22 
Engineering 15 
Social Psychology 6 
Economics and Accounting 8 
Total 134 
Table 8.1. Number of publications per discipline 
Period 
Number of 
publications 
1970s and before 3 
1980s 5 
1990s 34 
2000s 79 
2010s 13 
Total 134 
Table 8.2. Number of publications per period 
Concept 
Number of 
publications 
Fundamental compliance concepts  
(sections 8.3 and 8.4) 
63 
Compliance tactics (section 8.5) 91 
Compliance strategy (section 8.6) 52 
Table 8.3. Number of publications per concept 
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Level of analysis 
Number of 
publications 
Individual employee 44 
Collective (projects, organizational units) 60 
Organization 87 
(Inter)national bodies 24 
Table 8.4. Number of publications per analytical level 
8.3 Fundamentals of Compliance  
This section defines and discusses key concepts that function as the basis for 
our study, such as compliance, conformity, actors, norms and policies. The 
nature of compliance is also explored, resulting in the insights used to structure 
the two-dimensional framework that forms the foundation for our typology.  
8.3.1 Compliance – Definitions and Key Concepts 
There is no generally accepted definition of the term compliance (Faure and 
Lefevere, 2005; Pupke, 2008). Many authors define compliance as (the extent to 
which there is) adherence to laws and regulations (e.g. Zaelke et al., 2005; 
Faure and Lefevere, 2005; Mitchell, 1996; Schneiberg and Bartley, 2008) or to 
prescriptions in general, including industrial standards and internal policies (e.g. 
Kim, 2007; Daniel et al., 2009). Some authors also seem to include unwritten, 
ethical norms (e.g. Welcomer, 2002; Badea and Pana, 2010). Other authors go 
beyond compliance as a status-oriented concept and define the term as a process 
(e.g. Caldwell and Eid, 2007; Meeuwisse, 2010) or ability (e.g. IIA, 1997), or 
emphasize in their definitions the organizational structures and processes to 
ensure adherence to them (cf. Pupke, 2008). The term compliance has also been 
extended to include underlying goals, such as transparency and protecting an 
organization’s reputation (e.g. Panitz et al., 2010; Jourdan and Oehler, 2005; 
Pupke, 2008).  
In the literature there may be even less agreement on the term conformity (cf. 
Bond and Smith, 1996). Similar to compliance, conformity is regularly used as 
adherence to prescribed rules (Merton, 1957; Schapiro, 2003; Currie, 2008; 
Mitchell, 1996; Ellis et al., 1993; Tyler and Blader, 2005). Conformity has also 
been contrasted with compliance, with the latter following an explicit or implicit 
request, and the former referring to a state of accordance in the absence of a 
request (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). In this context, conformity is sometimes 
said to necessarily involve a change in belief or behavior (Zimbardo and 
Leippe, 1991; Rowe, 2005), whereas an actor can be compliant without a 
Chapter 8 
 
162 
 
position change (see below). In addition, conformity is seen as a broad concept 
that allows both public agreement and internalization of norms, whereas 
compliance represents public agreement without private agreement (Levine and 
Resnick, 1993; Bond and Smith, 1996). In addition, conformity is often used to 
specifically refer to the phenomenon that organizations within a particular 
institutional sphere tend to become more similar as time progresses (Scott, 
2003; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Finally, conformity is also seen as being 
comprised of both procedures and underlying goals (Philippe and Durand, 
2011). The term conformance, likewise, is not used in a single, specific manner. 
For example, Falkl (2005) distinguishes between compliance and conformance, 
with the former referring to a binary adherence to a strict norm (necessitating a 
pass-or-fail outcome) and the latter describing how well the norms are matched 
(allowing for adherence of certain aspects and non-adherence of others). Chopra 
and Singh (2006) use conformance to refer to a (software) agent adhering to the 
norms in terms of its design, whereas compliance refers to this issue in terms of 
an agent’s behavior. Other publications also use the term conformance in 
different ways (cf. Merton, 1957; The Open Group, 2009; Alter and Wright, 
2010; Currie, 2008; Panitz et al., 2010). Given the lack of agreement illustrated 
above, we will not distinguish between the three terms in our study unless 
explicitly specified.  
In this study we define compliance as the extent to which there exists a state 
of accordance between an actor’s behavior or products on the one side and 
predefined, relevant and explicit norms on the other (cf. Zaelke et al., 2005; 
Kim, 2007; Faure and Lefevere, 2005; Mitchell, 1996; Abdullah et al., 2009). 
Norms in this respect can be rules, procedures, conventions, standards, guide-
lines, principles, legislation or other prescriptions. Although we do not focus on 
compliance with the implicit, broader spirit of the norms, we do acknowledge 
(relatively high-level) principles as norms – on the condition that they be made 
explicit. Unwritten ethical norms are therefore also excluded from our defi-
nition. Although such norms can be external input from the organizational 
environment, in the context of this study they should be explicitly specified in 
an internal policy. A compliant state can be achieved regardless of the 
motivations, causes or circumstances that have led to it (Zaelke et al., 2005; 
Mitchell, 1996). In our view, therefore, an actor can be compliant without 
internalizing the norms and without necessarily changing his beliefs or 
behavior. Furthermore, compliance includes adherence that is unintentional and 
of which the regulated actor is unaware. Finally, compliance should be 
distinguished from effectiveness, as a compliant state need not necessarily result 
in achieving the desired end goals (Mitchell, 1996; Faure and Lefevere, 2005; 
Zaelke et al., 2005). To achieve compliance, an organization usually requires 
active compliance management, which we define as the organizational processes 
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and mechanisms intended to avoid, provide insight in, and deal with violations 
of and encourage compliance with relevant internal and external norms (cf. 
Abdullah et al., 2009; Caldwell and Eid, 2007). To prevent unethical business 
conduct and avoid regulatory penalties and loss of reputation, compliance 
management includes implementing structures and processes (see section 8.6.2). 
However, there are many more measures that can be taken. It is the primary aim 
of this chapter to identify these compliance tactics. 
The term norms (or prescriptions) serves as a general denotation that encom-
passes more specific forms such as laws, standards, rules, principles and 
guidelines. Therefore, norms can refer to general, abstract (but explicit) princi-
ples or to detailed rules – or anything in between. They can also refer to 
prohibitive norms (so-called proscriptions). Norms can thus be both prescribing 
and constraining by nature. Furthermore, they can be legally required or 
voluntary by nature. Norms can relate to both behavior and products. Requiring 
a project to use the organization’s standard system development method is an 
example of norms relating to behavior. Requiring the products produced by a 
business process to comply with organization-wide quality standards is an 
example of norms relating to products. Finally, prescriptions can (and probably 
will) change as time progresses. A coherent and goal-oriented set of norms is 
referred to here as a policy (cf. Garner, 2004; Kagal et al., 2003; ILRI, 1995). 
When applying norms or assessing them on conformance, several aspects or 
dimensions should be taken into account (Foorthuis et al., 2012). A prescription 
should be applied correctly. Its use, or lack of it, should also be justified in the 
respective situation. Another issue is whether related prescriptions are applied 
consistently. A final concern is whether the complete set of (mandatory) norms 
is applied, as opposed to merely a convenient subset. Given the latter, one 
relevant issue concerns whether norms are mandatory or not. In practice, quite 
some prescriptions prove to be voluntary in nature, e.g. industrial best practices. 
Adherence to the norms then is more akin to the narrow sense of conformity as 
defined by Cialdini and Goldstein (2004), i.e. adherence without a request. In 
other cases, such as internal guidelines, there may be a request, but the norms 
may have a comply-or-explain status. Even when norms are truly mandatory, 
they are not always perceived as such in practice (Boss et al. 2009). 
An internal regulator is a policy maker and upholder, such as a senior 
manager, policy drafter or compliance officer. We define an actor as an 
organizational entity acting within an organization, and equipped with cognitive 
capabilities, preferences, beliefs, values and at least some degree of autonomy 
(Hollis, 1994; Jones, 1991; Thiroux, 1977). As such, an actor can be e.g. an 
organizational unit, a project or an individual employee. In the context of this 
chapter, an actor is expected to comply with the norms (i.e. he is a regulated 
actor or regulatee). See section 8.3.3 for more on actors. 
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A distinction can be made between two types of non-compliance (cf. 
Schapiro, 2003; Merriam-Webster, 2011). First, a transgression (or violation) 
refers to a situation in which a norm is not complied with, e.g. by breaking a 
law or rule. A reason for this might be that the actor in question had no interest 
in conforming to this specific norm or simply did not know how to comply. 
Secondly, subversion refers to a situation in which an actor, for his own 
individual interest, attempts to undermine the entire compliance system itself, or 
at least an essential part of its norms. For example, when the implementation of 
standards is carried out in such a fashion as to demonstrate their inferiority and 
the need to abandon them altogether. In an organizational context, subversion 
might point to fundamental political problems, structural conflicts of interest or 
competing norm systems. An organization that is the result of a merger, for 
example, may have competing sets of architectural standards.  
We define a compliance tactic as a measure that can be taken, or a technique 
or mechanism that can be used, to encourage compliance of relevant 
organizational actors. Tactics can range from top management’s organization-
wide governance mechanisms to lower management localized measures. 
Furthermore, a tactic can be preventative, detective and corrective in nature 
(Sadiq and Indulska, 2008; Straub and Welke, 1998). Tactics can also be formal 
or informal by nature, and they need not be processes. As one tactic is typically 
not sufficient to obtain compliance, multiple tactics need to be combined into a 
coherent strategy. A compliance management strategy, therefore, is a general 
plan or pattern featuring a coherent set of compliance tactics that aims to bring 
the organization to a state that is compliant with relevant norms, at least to a 
sufficient level (cf. Quinn, 1996; cf. Mintzberg, 1987; see section 8.6 for an 
elaborate discussion on compliance strategies). Such a strategy may aim for 
holistic compliance, which incorporates three elements: coherent instead of 
fragmented compliance efforts (Volonino et al., 2004; Cleven and Winter, 
2009), a long-term scope (Sadiq and Indulska, 2008), and the ability of the 
approach to cover multiple laws, standards frameworks or internal procedures 
simultaneously.  
In section 8.1 we have stated that we will use the concept of compliance 
tactics instead of internal controls. There are several reasons for this. First and 
foremost, our use of tactics enables us to focus on the substantive essence of 
compliance endeavors, whereas internal controls focus attention to practical 
implementation. Second, we focus on identifying ways for stimulating 
compliance, i.e. more or less generic and atomic elements that can be included 
in a broader compliance management strategy. An internal control, however, is 
not such a pure and elementary measure, but an aggregate concept in itself. Per 
definition, it comprises multiple elements that should be considered as separate 
tactics in a list of re-usable measures (such as monitoring and ensuring 
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employee competency). A third reason why we focus on compliance tactics 
instead of internal controls, is that the latter concept is too narrow as a result of 
focusing on formal processes, thereby excluding several relevant compliance 
measures. Tactics, on the contrary, can be formal or informal, and they are not 
required to be processes. A fourth and final reason is that, in another sense, the 
concept of internal controls is too broad for the purpose of this study, focusing 
not only on compliance but also on other goals, such as general risk mitigation 
and efficiency and effectiveness of business activities.  
8.3.2 The Nature of Compliance 
In this section we will discuss some fundamental insights into compliance that 
will form the basis for our two-dimensional framework. In different fields, the 
literature on compliance distinguishes between two broad types of theory, 
namely rationalist and normative approaches (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Gross-
man and Zaelke, 2005; March and Olsen, 1998; Malloy, 2003; Hollis, 1994; Li 
et al., 2010; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Tyler and Blader, 2005; Zaelke et al., 2005; 
Mitchell, 1996). These theories provide distinct insights into compliance-related 
behavior and underlying motivations of states, organizations and individuals. 
The rationalist view focuses on the actor’s calculation of benefits and costs in 
his decision on whether or not to comply. This approach uses a “logic of 
consequences”, which sees actors as choosing rationally among alternatives. 
Game theory is a regularly used lens here to analyze behavioral motivations, 
using the prisoner’s dilemma to model the Hobbesian compliance problem 
described in this chapter’s Introduction (Kraus and Coleman, 1987; Hollis, 
1994). In a rationalistic perspective incentives and disincentives will alter the 
outcome of the actor’s calculation. Therefore, one major approach used here is 
enforcement (or command-and-control), in which punishment is used to deter 
unwanted behavior. Rewards are an additional means in the rationalistic 
perspective, increasing compliance by changing the cost-benefit calculation to 
the actor’s advantage.  
As a second perspective, the normative view focuses on cooperation and 
assistance as a way of encouraging compliance (Mitchell, 1996; Zaelke et al., 
2005; Malloy, 2003; Chayes and Chayes, 1993). This approach uses a “logic of 
appropriateness”, which views actions as based on identities, roles, obligations, 
and considerations of appropriate, fair and legitimate action. Normative theories 
do not take the stance that an actor’s behavior is irrational, but tend to broaden 
the scope to prevent reducing the discussion to costs and benefits. Actors are 
seen as following the institutionalized rules and practices that link particular 
identities to particular situations. These rules need to be internalized and viewed 
as legitimate by those subject to them. Not restricted by the somewhat cynical 
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Hobbesian perspective, it is acknowledged that compliance may be hindered if 
rules are ambiguous, complex or continuously changing, or if they are too 
numerous or not easily available. Non-compliance may also be the inadvertent 
result of deficient routines or a lack of capacity, knowledge or commitment. For 
all these reasons, non-compliance should be managed instead of being 
sanctioned. Methods to increase compliance therefore often focus on increasing 
the actor’s capacity to comply. This is effectuated by cooperating, providing 
support and encouraging shared discourse in order to render rules clearer, more 
persuasive and easier to commit to. 
Rational and normative models are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
complement each other and provide different lenses for analyzing influences on 
compliance behavior (Tyler and Blader, 2005; Welcomer, 2002; Zaelke et al., 
2005; March and Olsen, 1998; Malloy, 2003). Both perspectives are relevant to 
our research. For example, organization-wide standards may be dismissed for 
rational reasons, as conforming to them may take additional time and effort. Or 
it may be that the organizational units and employees conform to industrial 
standards because they value their identity as “professionals” or their role as 
“managers”. Governmental organizations may also feel “obliged”, or consider it 
“appropriate” not to spend tax payers’ money unnecessarily. Both perspectives 
should therefore be taken into account. 
8.3.3 Levels of analysis 
Although theories from both the rational and normative perspective often regard 
actors that need to comply as unitary agents, a comprehensive perspective on 
compliance also needs to be able to disaggregate an actor into multiple sub-
actors (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Malloy, 2003; Zaelke et al, 2005). An 
organization is comprised of structural units, such as divisions and their sub-
units, and of temporary initiatives, such as programs and their projects and 
teams. Furthermore, all of these entities will have individual members. 
Motivations for compliance-related behavior may differ between these different 
sub-actors (Malloy, 2003; Braganza and Franken, 2007), thus requiring different 
compliance measures. We deal with this issue in our study by acknowledging 
three conceptual levels. First, the level of the enterprise as a whole, in which 
“enterprise” can be taken to mean the entire organization, a division or even a 
network of organizations (cf. The Open Group, 2009). This is the level at which 
the internal regulators are located and at which the policies are determined – 
although there may obviously be pressure from higher (external) levels, which 
are out of scope here. The second level accommodates various types of 
collectives that are expected to comply. They exist within the enterprise, such as 
departments and their sub-units and programs and their projects and teams. 
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These collectives typically have a more local scope and may have a political 
agenda that can, at least in part, be inconsistent with the wider enterprise and its 
policies. The third level is that of individuals, who may be directly expected to 
comply (e.g. in the case of information security procedures) or who may be part 
of a collective that is requested to comply (e.g. in the case of a project 
implementing a medical administration system that needs to comply with 
privacy regulations). In both cases, the decisions and behavior of individuals are 
determinants of actual compliance. However, although an individual may be 
inclined to comply, the project of which he is part may not.  
8.4 A Typology of Compliance Tactics 
Based on the fundamental insights discussed above, this section will present the 
two-dimensional conceptual structure within which the tactics for stimulating 
compliance will be positioned. The horizontal dimension represents the focus of 
the compliance solution, for which the fundamental characteristics of both the 
rationalist and the normative compliance approaches are used as defining 
elements. As these types of theory provide different perspectives on behavioral 
motivations for compliance, they can accommodate tactics of a different nature. 
The rationalist perspective puts forward inducement (the use of incentives or 
rewards) and enforcement (the use of disincentives or penalties), whereas the 
normative perspective offers management
3
 of compliance (the use of 
cooperation, assistance and persuasion). After most tactics were identified in the 
literature review, we also added assessment (the use of e.g. self-reporting, 
external audits and self-reflection in order to obtain insights and achieve 
transparency). The tactics herein were originally placed in other columns. 
However, since assessment is a prerequisite for both the rational and normative 
approaches (cf. Faure and Lefevere, 2005), and the set of management tactics 
grew to be relatively large, we decided to acknowledge this as a separate class. 
Another rationale for this is that assessments can be expected to have a deterrent 
effect by themselves, which constitutes another reason for them to be regarded 
as an autonomous group of tactics (Short and Toffel, 2010; Foorthuis et al., 
2010).  
 
                                              
3  We use “management” here to refer to the ways in which the normative approach encourages 
compliance, since this term is widely used in the literature. Note that we use “compliance 
management” in a broader sense, viz. also encompassing inducement, enforcement and 
assessment. 
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Figure 8.2. Typology of Compliance Tactics 
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The vertical dimension represents the organizational level at which the 
tactics are applied, i.e. the level at which the internal regulators’ effort is made 
(note that it does not denote the actor at which the tactic is targeted). The enter-
prise level is the level at which the internal policy and its norms are formulated, 
perhaps based on external input. This is also the level at which the compliance 
management strategy is developed and at which senior management, compliance 
officers and organization-wide auditors operate. The collective level is the level 
of tactics for stimulating compliance of organizational units and temporary 
initiatives, such as projects that need to conform. The individual level accom-
modates tactics targeted at individual employees that are expected to comply. 
Figure 8.2 is a visual representation of the full typology. The tactics 
positioned within it are discussed in detail in section 8.5 (innovative tactics are 
marked with an asterisk and will be discussed in 8.5.10). We will refer to the 
empty two-dimensional structure described above as the framework, whereas 
the structure including the tactics – this chapter’s core contribution – will be 
denoted as the typology. A typology is used to describe conceptually derived 
interrelated sets of ideal types (Doty and Glick, 1994). Such types are defined 
by more than one attribute simultaneously (i.e. they are multidimensional by 
nature), with the order of the attributes being irrelevant (Marradi, 1990). A 
typology does not feature discrete, mathematical decision rules for classifying, 
and mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness cannot be entirely guaranteed 
(Doty and Glick, 1994; Rich, 1992; Smith, 2002). Our inventory of compliance 
tactics constitutes a typology, since they are defined by multiple attributes (the 
two dimensions of our framework plus any idiosyncratic characteristics to 
distinguish them within a given cell), are theoretically derived conceptual 
constructs (i.e. based on literature instead of e.g. empirical-based cluster 
analysis), and mathematical decision rules are not provided.  
The framework can be used to position and characterize individual tactics. 
However, the framework can also be used to describe an organization’s com-
pliance management strategy, which is a general, integrated plan or pattern 
consisting of multiple tactics with the intention of achieving a satisfactory level 
of internal compliance. As a strategy utilizes multiple tactics, it typically covers 
several cells of the framework. We will return to the topic of compliance 
strategies in section 8.6.2. First, however, we will explicate the individual 
tactics of the typology. 
8.5 Compliance Tactics 
This section describes the typology’s tactics, which have been identified during 
the literature study. Innovative tactics from the (inter)national laws and regu-
lations level are translated to internal tactics for organizations in section 8.5.10. 
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The tactics are represented by bold italic text and can be found in the visualized 
typology presented in Figure 8.2. Regular italic text is (amongst others) used for 
showing relationships between tactics. 
8.5.1 Enterprise Level Inducement and Enforcement 
A first tactic at the enterprise level is mandating compliance officers to provide 
incentives. A problem for those directly responsible for achieving compliance, 
e.g. security officers, is that they often lack the line authority over the employees 
in their compliance scope (Malloy, 2003; Boss et al., 2009; SIA, 2005). This 
means specifically that it will be very difficult for them to punish transgressors 
themselves. Rewarding complying employees, however, can be expected to be a 
less sensitive issue due to its positive character. Developing guidelines for 
rewarding and punishing results in enterprise-level standards, which should 
prevent rewards and penalties being given arbitrarily and inconsistently 
throughout the organization. This will increase the level of perceived fairness 
and consistency of the procedures (i.e. procedural justice), which is a significant 
determinant of compliance (Li et al., 2010; Weaver et al., 1999b; Tyler and 
Blader, 2005; Malloy, 2003). Making such norms and conditions explicit may 
also increase their perceived ‘mandatoriness’, which can further boost 
compliance levels (Boss et al., 2009). Although more difficult than the first 
tactic, it will still be necessary to mandate compliance officers to provide 
disincentives, or at least introduce formal procedures to investigate possible 
non-compliance and contact transgressors’ line managers to discuss punitive 
measures. In addition, examples can be made out of non-compliers by severely 
and visibly punishing notable transgressors. Even if the organization does not 
intent to e.g. fire or prosecute all employees that have committed a severe 
transgression, such examples may deter potential future non-compliers (cf. 
Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Straub and Welke, 1998; Currie, 2008).  
8.5.2 Enterprise Level Assessment 
As an assessment tactic at the enterprise level, gaining insight into enterprise-
wide compliance rates is necessary for both internal compliance management 
and external reporting. Important features of such a centrally available 
integrating analysis function are flexible reporting to different stakeholders, 
integration with workflows (feedback of non-compliance to those responsible 
and definition of escalation structures), integration with planning activities, 
remediation tracking and risk classification (Panitz et al., 2010; Racz et al., 
2010). A central reporting function can be supported by business intelligence 
technology (Volonino et al., 2004; Daniel et al., 2009). Local data, such as audit 
trails, can be extracted and loaded in a central data warehouse, enabling 
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aggregated reporting and holistic knowledge-development. Analytical and 
statistical techniques can be used to discover patterns. Standardized data models 
are valuable in this context, as they facilitate improved integration of local data 
and allow inter-organizational benchmarking (Kim et al., 2007; Panitz et al., 
2010). A thorough investigation evaluates existing compliance and ethics 
programs, e.g. by benchmarking and using external auditors and informants (cf. 
Weaver et al., 1999b; Arjoon, 2006). With the insights gained, the organization 
can reflect on its culture in terms of compliance. This can be seen as a 
comprehensive and deep diagnosis of the corporate culture and its behavior in 
terms of compliance and ethics (Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2003). This need 
not be an incidental affair but can be part of an ongoing process. As part of this 
exercise, one goal would be to gain insight into the degree of policy-induced 
compliance (i.e. compliance as a result of the compliance management 
approach) versus externally determined compliance (e.g. a shift in values at the 
societal level) (Mitchell, 1996). If compliance is the result of the chosen 
approach, it should be determined if actors have accepted and internalized the 
norms or act on rational grounds instead (Tyler and Blader, 2005). Reflecting 
also entails understanding non-compliance, which might be the result of high 
compliance costs, a poor organizational climate, a lack of technical knowledge 
or complex, ambiguous or difficult-to-find rules (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; 
Pulich and Tourigny, 2004; Zaelke et al., 2005; Mitchell, 1996). Moreover, it 
should be assessed whether non-compliance merely consists of transgressions or 
that subversion is also involved. It should also be asked how both formal 
internal controls and informal organizational aspects contribute to or detract 
from desirable compliance behavior (Weaver et al., 1999b). More funda-
mentally, norms and policies should be evaluated on their desirability and 
completeness, an endeavor that may require engagement of both internal and 
external stakeholders (Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2003; Welcomer, 2002; SIA, 
2005). It should furthermore be verified whether existing policies actually 
contain practical and valuable norms, as opposed to e.g. ‘ivory tower’ standards. 
Depending on the situation, there are also different forms, domains and methods 
of reflection. Risk analysis is one important form of reflection, focusing not 
only on risks regarding non-compliance, but also on risks in achieving the 
company’s objectives. In the domain of security and privacy, for example, a risk 
analysis can use questionnaires as a method for measuring employees’ attitudes 
towards compliance with encryption rules and identifying reasons for non-
compliance (Gaunt, 1998; Hurley, 2004). Such questionnaires can also be used 
for more practical purposes, such as identifying lacking skills in order to specify 
training requirements and learn what type of new personnel to hire (ibid.). All 
insights mentioned above should inform the development of a new compliance 
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management strategy. In addition, the mere act of openly discussing ethics and 
norms tends to encourage good behavior (Treviño et al., 2006).  
Auditing the compliance function is a more tangible means for gaining 
enterprise-level insight into the current state of affairs (IIA, 1997; Hamilton, 
1995; IFAC 2003; Hayes et al., 2005; SIA, 2005). Such assessments focus on 
entire compliance programs and on the system of internal controls that aims to 
guarantee compliance. Even the audit function itself can be verified, e.g. against 
generally accepted accounting principles. Using self-reporting of compliance 
status from actors may constitute an effective tactic for obtaining knowledge on 
compliance levels of individual actors (Heyes, 2000). Self-reporting of 
transgressions can directly induce self-correction, but a report can also be a 
motivation for having compliance verified in more detail by an independent 
assessor. The degree to which self-reporting is a suitable means may depend on 
the intentions of the actor in question (Stanton et al., 2005) and the degree of 
trust in the relationship (Burgemeestre et al., 2009). Installing a whistle-blower 
hotline ensures that employees can safely report violations internally (Pater-
noster and Simpson, 1996; Weaver et al., 1999a). Such a function should 
guarantee professional treatment of the report, and anonymity to appease fear of 
retaliation (Geva, 2006). Another tactic at the enterprise level is training 
compliance assessors, such as auditors, which is necessary in order to ensure 
professional competence (cf. Hayes et al., 2005; IFAC, 2003). It is also 
desirable because it stimulates that both assessments performed and measures 
taken are consistent throughout the organization, increasing perceived fairness 
(cf. Tyler and Blader, 2005; Foorthuis et al, 2012). 
8.5.3 Enterprise Level Management 
As a crucial aspect of compliance management at the enterprise-level, creating 
internal commitment by external justification can be achieved in various ways. 
One fundamental way is to ensure the internal policy itself is consistent with the 
norms of the organization’s environment. This not only yields external support, 
but also mobilizes commitment of internal participants (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Organizations may choose, for example, to be consistent with new, pres-
tigious or fashionable systems development approaches, project management 
methodologies and other industrial standards. Another way to create commit-
ment to internal policies is to have them justified by highly professionalized 
external consultants. Their blessings can strengthen internal legitimacy and 
prevent the rise of internal dissidents (ibid.). Policies should also be properly 
specified in order to be effective. The mere act of specifying norms may 
increase their perceived ‘mandatoriness’ (Boss et al., 2009) and prevent ‘moral 
laxity’ (Geva, 2006). The nature of the norms should be decided for each policy. 
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First, the abstraction level should be decided upon, namely opting for high-level 
principles versus detailed rules (Arjoon, 2006; Burgemeestre et al., 2009). A 
rule-based approach assumes that actors will not hide behind the rules. A 
principles-based approach assumes that actors can and will reflect upon the 
outcomes of their actions, and that they will not abuse the freedom inherent in 
such an approach. A second but related decision concerns the degree of discre-
tion that the regulated actor is granted, i.e. stating performance objectives versus 
precise methods to achieve them (Philippe and Durand, 2011; Schneiberg and 
Bartley, 2008). As norms are often found to be ambiguous, group-specific and 
context-dependent, it is crucial that they be specified as clearly and explicitly as 
possible (Mitchell, 1996; Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2003; Foorthuis et al., 
2012; Malloy, 2003). A prescription statement should be precise and detailed, 
albeit not too precise and detailed, since to express one thing is to exclude the 
other (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). A norm’s rationale should also be explicitly 
stated. A rationale describes the reasons behind the prescription, i.e. the 
business benefits that can be achieved or the threats that can be averted, and 
should act as a motivator for compliance (Richardson et al., 1990; Emmerich et 
al., 1999; Pahnila et al, 2007). Explicit norms and their rationales may be 
especially important in cases where employees tend to have incorrect theories 
regarding the world (cf. Treviño et al., 2006). Norms should also be prioritized 
to guide decisions in case of conflicts, and examples can be provided to help 
with their interpretation (Geva, 2006; Foorthuis et al., 2012). Finally, policies 
should neither be too long nor too short (Pahnila et al, 2007). The mere 
existence of a policy obviously does not ensure compliance. After specifying, 
therefore, the policies need to be actively disseminated throughout the 
enterprise, with the intention to inform the respective population of regulated 
actors of the existence, content and importance of the policy, and to convince 
them to comply with it (cf. Zaelke et al., 2005). In order for norms to influence 
behavior, it is important that they are salient and ‘activated’ in the particular 
situation to which they apply (Malloy, 2003). The policy should not only be 
actively communicated (‘push’), but also be easily accessible via e.g. the 
organization’s intranet (‘pull’) (cf. Gaunt, 1998; Pahnila et al., 2007). The 
internal communications staff should be involved to make maximum use of 
existing facilities. The tone of the communication (e.g. ‘tell’ or ‘sell’) is 
dependent upon the audience and the nature of the relationship (Braganza and 
Franken, 2007). As part of the dissemination process, the internal regulators can 
require employees to acknowledge receipt of the policy and even to 
acknowledge their intention of complying with it (Weaver et al., 1999b).  
Instead of merely prohibiting certain undesired acts, they can also be 
prevented altogether, usually by restricting behavior preceding the transgressive 
act (Straub, 1990; Mitchell, 1990; Straub and Welke, 1998). For example, 
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chaperoning may prevent illegal transactions, with a compliance officer 
accompanying and supervising crucial meetings (cf. SIA, 2005). In addition, 
using deontic concepts (such as permissions, obligations, prohibitions, 
dispensations and delegations) and technical means such as encryption and 
firewalls, IT-systems and data can be electronically secured from inquisitive but 
unauthorized actors (Cuppens-Boulahia and Cuppens, 2008; Breaux et al., 2009; 
Kagal et al., 2003). Another important factor in achieving compliance is 
ensuring management support for policies and compliance related matters. 
Research has shown that commitment of senior management has important 
implications for the scope and control orientation (e.g. rationalistic versus 
normative) of compliance programs (Weaver et al., 1999a). Support entails, 
firstly, that management actively and visibly propagates the importance of the 
policy and of compliance with its norms (Pahnila et al., 2007; Boss et al., 2009; 
Foorthuis et al., 2010; Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010; SIA, 2005). In addition 
to jawboning, this includes approving a policy, so as to grant it a formal status. 
Secondly, management should mobilize resources, by making decisions that 
may not benefit all local organizational units, and by providing compliance 
personnel with access to senior management (Boh and Yellin, 2007; Malloy, 
2003; SIA, 2005). Thirdly, management should set the example in words and 
deeds by showing adherence to the policy, as its norms will lose credibility 
otherwise, leaving middle managers and regular employees discouraged to 
comply (Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2003; Tyler and Blader, 2005; Puhakainen 
and Siponen, 2010; Pulich and Tourigny, 2004). Needless to say, a condition for 
providing support is that management is aware of the necessity of compliance. 
This could mean that they should be made aware by compliance officers.  
As organizations are not unitary actors, it is increasingly recognized that 
understanding and using social structures is crucial for obtaining compliance 
(Zaelke et al., 2005; Malloy, 2003). For example, internal power relationships 
between e.g. CEO, CFO and CIO can play a role in compliance with Sarbanes-
Oxley (Braganza and Franken, 2007). Promoting the policy and actual 
compliance are dependent on the support and commitment of key decision 
makers. Such support and commitment can be stimulated by gestures of 
goodwill. Another way of using social relationships for increasing the 
likelihood of compliance is empowering those key actors (Zaelke, Stilwell and 
Young, 2005), for example by expanding or extending their mandates or by 
other tactics mentioned in this chapter, such as funding and assistance. Both the 
selection of such tactics and the specific implementation of a given tactic may 
depend on the nature of these existing social relationships. Good informal 
personal relationships should also be mentioned here, as they allow for better 
cooperation, discussions on compliance and fine-grained insights into the 
actors’ interests and reasons for non-compliance (cf. Wasserman, 2009). 
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Gathering and creating knowledge can be valuable for several reasons 
(Braganza and Franken, 2007; Straub and Welke, 1998). First, as the semantic, 
conceptual, technical, procedural and judicial aspects of external policies can be 
quite complex, the organization needs to prepare itself for policy implemen-
tation. This entails collecting and understanding not only those policies and their 
norms, but also any additional sources that can help with their interpretation. 
Secondly, the organization can explore academic knowledge and orient itself to 
generic practitioner reference models for compliance. Examples of the latter are 
Red Book 2.0, i.e. the GRC Capability Model (OCEG, 2009) and frameworks 
for auditing (e.g. IFAC, 2003). There are also frameworks for general 
governance (COSO, 1994) and IT governance, such as COBIT (IT Governance 
Institute, 2000) and SAC (Mair, 2002). Entire reference models may be 
implemented or only specific elements may be used. A combination of 
approaches may also be employed, as their focus is often complementary (Luthy 
and Forcht, 2006). COSO has a broader scope, for example, but COBIT 
provides more detailed specifications. Thirdly, the enterprise needs to build 
knowledge on how best to apply and deal with the norms, given its own unique 
characteristics and context. It is likely that this knowledge has to be created 
from practical experiences within the organization itself. Fourthly, external 
policies may not only constrain a business organization, but may also provide 
competitive opportunities and drivers for innovation. Compliance often entails 
keeping business records and process logs (see also the gaining insight into 
enterprise-wide compliance rates and using IT-systems for storing and 
managing auditable information tactics). When dealt with from a holistic 
framework, this can yield improved insights into the entire organization. Such 
insights can be used not only for taking corrective action, but also for improving 
overall efficiency and the organization’s competitive position (Volonino et al., 
2004). More specifically, they provide opportunities for redesigning processes 
to reduce complexity and redundancy, and to improve information quality and 
risk management (ibid.; Braganza and Franken, 2007; Racz et al., 2010). Once a 
compliance knowledge base is built, its contents should be made available. A 
central repository, such as the company’s intranet (Kerrigan et al., 2003; 
Braganza and Franken, 2007), provides a necessary but passive way of 
knowledge dissemination. Therefore, it is likely that more active complemen-
tary activities are required, such as training.  
Another significant way of disseminating knowledge is by facilitating 
communities of practice, in which practitioners can discuss and share explicit, 
tacit and cultural knowledge and norms (Wenger, 2000; Choo, 2006). Such 
communities can organize knowledge exchanges, by which the different types 
of experiences and knowledge mentioned in the gathering and creating 
knowledge tactic can be communicated, negotiated and made more explicit. 
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Communities of practice, therefore, enable both creation and dissemination of 
knowledge. Moreover, being social communities, they can help promote, 
institutionalize and internalize norms, create commitment, and as such 
encourage compliance (cf. Daniel et al., 2003). Such communities are largely 
self-organized and informal in nature. However, although management need not 
formally control them, communities may be facilitated by providing them with 
resources, time and freedom.  
A related tactic is the institutionalized socialization of newcomers, which is 
an enterprise-wide means to facilitate newcomers’ learning about desirable and 
effective organizational behavior and to promote a culture of compliance. It is 
associated with the development of positive attitudes, such as higher job 
involvement, organizational commitment and compliance with organizational 
standards (Pulich and Tourigny, 2004). In this regard, newcomer orientation 
provides a way to communicate organizational norms and values (and why they 
are deemed important), the organization’s mission and vision, and its appraisal 
and reward system. This can be communicated through training, mentorship 
programs, role modeling, corporate videos, welcome sessions and induction 
programs (ibid.; Treviño et al., 2006; Hallier and James, 1999). This should 
increase newcomers’ sense of belonging, integrate them within the 
organizational culture, and teach them the values, norms, beliefs and preferred 
behaviors. Instead of leaving it entirely to HR, managers should be actively 
involved in newcomer orientation (Pulich and Tourigny, 2004) and promote a 
culture of compliance (SIA, 2005). (See the ensuring management support 
tactic for other ways in which management can contribute.) Socialization 
processes may take the form of organizational rituals, ceremonies, storytelling 
and other symbolic acts (Islam and Zyphur, 2009; Thralls, 1992; Pulich and 
Tourigny, 2004). However, rituals and ceremonials can also have a 
counterproductive effect, such as role distance and instrumental attachment 
(Hallier and James, 1999; Islam and Zyphur, 2009). Examples of rituals are 
rites of passage (consisting of symbolic acts to allow employees to transition to 
a new role and normative setting) and rites of renewal (consisting of symbolic 
acts that are periodically staged to reassert the dominance of certain 
organizational values) (Islam and Zyphur, 2009; Thralls, 1992). 
8.5.4 Collective Level Inducement and Enforcement 
As an incentive at the collective level, certain compliance-unrelated expenses 
might be funded, as a reward for compliance with the policy. The IT costs of a 
project, for example, are sometimes centrally funded on the condition that it 
conforms to the enterprise architecture (Foorthuis et al., 2010, 2012). In 
addition, compliance can be rewarded by providing political support for other 
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initiatives of the actor in question, such as an approval of ambitious local pro-
grams or support for the appointment of a department’s senior representative at 
an influential position within the organization. Another tactic is the organization-
wide celebration of successes if they are achieved in a compliant fashion. 
Publicly acknowledging successes not only fosters team coherence, but also 
values that are intrinsic to high performance (Hefner and Malcolm, 2002). This 
will demonstrate to other actors that compliance need not be a restriction and 
may even increase chances of success.  
A project or department can be punished for non-compliance by rejecting 
the project deliverable (Project Management Institute, 2004). This can occur, 
for example, if a developed software solution has not been described in 
sufficient detail to meet the standards set by the party responsible for 
maintaining it in production (especially if this is an external party). Rejection 
need not be final, since the deliverable may be accepted after reworking it in 
accordance with the norms. However, in extreme cases, terminating the project 
may be a serious alternative.  
8.5.5 Collective Level Assessment 
Using IT-systems for storing and managing auditable information ensures 
verifiability (Currie, 2008; Daniel et al., 2009). Compliance often entails 
keeping business records, so as to facilitate standard control and reporting 
processes and to ensure the possibility of future assessments. Although systems 
at the enterprise level will in practice also store records (e.g ERP-systems), 
keeping log trails mostly involves business applications of specific organi-
zational units. In general, systems need to be able to store time-dependent data, 
offer version-control, register employees updating information, authenticate 
data (e.g. checksum functionality), enable fine-grained permanent deletion of 
privacy-sensitive data, and back-up and archive data with third parties (Peterson 
and Burns, 2006). Logging process and decision trails in IT-systems renders 
actors traceable, the awareness of which may have a direct deterrent effect and 
makes this a tactic in its own right. However, trails storage is also a prerequisite 
for performing assessments. Compliance assessments of log trails and other 
artifacts of decisions, processes, systems and projects are conducted to verify 
whether the norms are actually complied with in practice (Ellis et al., 1993; 
Botha and Boon, 2003; Foorthuis et al., 2012; Agrawal et al., 2006). A recent 
survey (n=293) found the use of compliance assessments to be the most 
important determinant of conformance to organizational standards, probably 
due to assessments emphasizing the importance of compliance and to actors’ 
desire to avoid confrontation (Foorthuis et al., 2010). The results of such an 
assessment or audit can be reason to take corrective action. The object of 
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scrutiny here can be behavior, such as when it is verified whether a project 
conforms to the standards of the relevant project management or systems 
development methodology. In addition, an assessment can verify product 
quality by reviewing the project’s design documents or by checking the 
delivered output of a production process against the quality standards. As a 
result of our definition of compliance, what is central in an assessment is 
whether the behavior and products are consistent with the norms, not if they are 
consistent because of the norms. Finding the actual causes of compliance is 
explored in the aforementioned reflecting tactic. Several types of assessments 
can be acknowledged, which will be discussed below.  
Automatic compliance assessments determine electronically whether an 
organization and its processes and data conform to the norms. Such a verifi-
cation process uses formal process models, meta models, rules and constraints. 
A distinction can be made between design-time (e.g. when designing business 
processes), run-time (when actually running business processes) and after-the-
fact (when verifying audit trails) compliance checking (Ly et al., 2008). 
Research has been conducted on implementation in various technologies, such 
as Formal Contract Language, First-Order Predicate Logic, Concurrent 
Transaction Logic, Event Algebra, Concurrent Temporal Logic and Linear 
Temporal Logic (Governatori et al., 2006; Kerrigan et al., 2003; Ly et al., 2008; 
Kim et al., 2007). Automated verification offers large coverage – due to fast 
automated checking – and accurate and consistent results – due to the required 
formalization of norms (El Kharbili et al., 2008; Hurley, 2004). This type of 
surveillance is therefore well suited for continuous routine monitoring. 
Automated systems may also assist managers in organizing written assessment 
reports, help assign responsibilities to employees, and enforce procedures 
instead of merely verifying them (Agrawal et al., 2006). Employing automated 
solutions therefore has the additional benefit of freeing up resources that can be 
reallocated to other purposes (Hurley, 2004). Despite these benefits, however, 
manual compliance assessments will remain necessary. Not all norms are 
suitable for automated checking, not only as a result of inherently abstract and 
multi-interpretable prescriptions stated in natural language, but also because of 
the importance of sense-making and personal and contextual knowledge in the 
verification process (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Foorthuis et al., 2012). 
Automatic compliance assessments therefore may often result mainly in self-
evident outcomes. Conducted by human agents, manual assessments can on the 
other hand be used for sophisticated, subtle, subjective and situated evaluation. 
This may be especially relevant in specific cases in which an in-depth audit is 
required. Examples of methods that can be employed are interviewing 
employees, observing operations, and reviewing records and documents (ibid., 
Short and Toffel, 2010). 
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8.5.6 Collective Level Management 
Providing assistance to projects or organizational units can increase compliance 
levels. For example, technical and personnel assistance can be provided to 
ensure that norms are explained and that sufficient guidance, knowledge and 
capacity are available (Braganza and Franken, 2007; Zaelke et al., 2005; 
Foorthuis et al., 2010). Individuals can also be offered help and assistance when 
confronted with ethical and compliance issues, e.g. by a telephone advice 
service (Weaver et al., 1999b). Such facilitating conditions may also positively 
impact attitudes towards complying (Pahnila et al., 2007). Knowledge can relate 
to the norms directly (helping with their interpretation) or to required technical 
expertise. As a specific form of assistance, compliance costs can be compensa-
ted for, so as to let compliance be a budget-neutral aspect of business (Mitchell, 
1996; Braganza and Franken, 2007). Apart from accessible knowledge 
repositories, facilitating communities of practice and training, knowledge can 
be brought in by selecting compatible and knowledgeable employees. Selecting 
here refers not only to hiring personnel from outside the organization, but also 
to matching internal employees with projects, and moving individuals between 
subsidiaries on secondment (Harris and Cummings, 2007; Braganza and 
Franken, 2007). Critical selection is also important when hiring or appointing 
employees that have to make ethics and compliance-related decisions in 
ambiguous situations (Treviño et al., 2006). Selection criteria are not restricted 
to specific knowledge (resulting from relevant education or working expe-
rience), but also involve congruent and accepted ethical standards (ibid.; Tyler 
and Blader, 2005; Geva, 2006; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and the expectation 
of whether candidates will abide by the organizational rules (Pulich and 
Tourigny, 2004; Ogbonna and Harris, 1998). In the case of external consultants 
a welcome bonus may be that they are less biased and are unhampered by the 
organization chart (Burditt, 1996). During the selection process, compliance 
personnel may go as far as to check a candidate’s disciplinary or complaint 
history (SIA, 2005). 
8.5.7 Individual Level Inducement and Enforcement 
At the individual level, offering formal rewards is a well-known inducement 
tactic. This can take a variety of forms, such as pay raises, promotions, awards, 
bonuses, days off, paid vacations, sabbaticals and stocks (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; 
Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996). Interestingly 
enough, an organization should not blindly offer incentives. In the case of 
employees who have already internalized the respective norms, rewards may 
work counterproductive, as providing incentives to act morally might 
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undermine the intrinsic value of ethical behavior or might lower the 
responsibility felt by individuals (Treviño et al., 2006; Brekke et al., 2003). 
Offering social rewards focuses on proven informal incentives, such as 
compliments, praise and commendations, a word of thanks, personal mention 
and appreciation in oral or written assessments, celebrating heroes, and the 
increase in one’s self-respect, reputation and status that come with that 
(Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997; Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2003; Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Pulich and Tourigny, 2004). In addition, adherents can also be offered 
professional rewards, such as interesting courses or challenging and prestigious 
assignments. 
There are also several tactics related to punishment at this level. Ample 
research has been carried out on penalties, often from the perspective of 
deterrence theory. Severity, certainty and celerity have been shown to be crucial 
factors in this context (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Tyler and Blader, 2005; 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Imposing formal penalties brings with it threats such as 
monetary or legal sanctions, demotion, loss of occupational position and 
jeopardizing future job prospects (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Bulgurcu et 
al., 2010; Straub and Welke, 1998). Usually, an organization will make use of 
‘progressive discipline’, in which oral warnings are followed by written 
warning, suspension and finally job termination (Pulich and Tourigny, 2004). 
Another type of disincentives for individuals is imposing social penalties on 
violators. These more intangible tactics might take the form of reprimands, 
‘naming and shaming’, suspension, unfavorable mention in oral or written 
assessments and the consequent loss of self-respect, reputation and status 
(Malloy, 2003; Braganza and Franken, 2007; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Paternoster 
and Simpson, 1996). 
8.5.8 Individual Level Assessment 
Providing performance feedback is a proven and inexpensive management 
tactic for improving employee behavior (Kluger and DeNisi, 1996; Stajkovic 
and Luthans, 1997; Pulich and Tourigny, 2004). This tactic derives its power 
from providing the employee with objective information on his performance, 
preferably presented in an immediate, positive and specific fashion. The focus 
should be on the task rather than the person. Examples of desired behavior can 
also be provided. The information can trigger a performance-improving reaction 
within the employee, for example because he is encouraged to reduce the 
discrepancy between his performance and the standard or because of an inner 
motivation to raise the bar.  
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8.5.9 Individual Level Management 
Training regulated actors clarifies the rules and the measures taken against 
transgressors (Mitchell, 1996). In the context of security policies, for example, a 
training should communicate and spread understanding of the norms (“encrypt 
e-mails”), provide required knowledge (information classification rules) and 
teach necessary skills (using encryption software) (Puhakainen and Siponen, 
2010; Braganza and Franken, 2007; Straub and Welke, 1998). More in general, 
an important goal is making employees aware of the prescriptions’ underlying 
rationales and benefits, and of the consequences and risks of non-compliance 
(e.g. making the organization vulnerable to an outside attack). This awareness 
should influence the attitudes of employees and the consequent intentions to 
comply. Communicating the penalties and rewards during the training may 
likewise influence attitudes (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Straub and Welke, 1998). 
Organizations should organize frequent compliance trainings (MacLean and 
Behnam, 2010). Furthermore, different types of training may be required for 
different types of employees. For example, technical people may need less 
training on encryption tools than do sales people (Puhakainen and Siponen, 
2010). In order to increase motivation, training should also focus on tasks 
relevant to the course participants (ibid.).  
Employing social psychological mechanisms, in essence, consists of a wide 
variety of compliance techniques to influence individuals (Zimbardo and 
Leippe, 1991; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). For example, the door-in-the-face 
technique involves making a large request, which is likely to get rejected. The 
actor may subsequently reciprocate the requester’s ‘concession’ by his or her 
own concession, i.e. complying. When the that’s-not-all technique is employed, 
the target is presented with an initial request, after which a bonus is added to the 
deal. The increased benefits, perceptual contrast and the urge to reciprocate 
often result in compliance. The foot-in-the-door technique works by first asking 
the compliance-target to comply with a small and easy request. After 
compliance is assured, a larger and often related request is made, resulting in 
compliant behavior. Another technique here is to use the obedience to authority 
rule, which seems deeply ingrained in human nature. This rule makes it very 
hard to say “no” to authority figures, even if the request would inflict damage to 
others. A final technique we will mention here is good cop/bad cop, in which 
one professional takes a harsh approach in trying to have the actor comply. His 
colleague subsequently takes a soft and conciliatory approach, pretending to be 
allied with the actor and promising to prevent the severe penalties the bad cop 
threatened him with (Cialdini, 1987). See the social psychological literature for 
more techniques. The organization could also have personnel sign an agree-
ment (Gaunt, 1998; Straub, 1990). Working with confidentiality agreements, for 
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example, is common when employees have to work with sensitive data. 
Explicitly agreeing with a policy may increase the commitment felt by the 
regulatees, as they are given responsibility and accountability. Note that all 
employees have a ‘psychological contract’ with their organization, taking the 
form of expectations regarding the duties of the organization and of themselves. 
Such expectations tend to be implicit, so managers should try and clarify them 
(Pulich and Tourigny, 2004). Another managerial tactic is providing organi-
zational support, in which employees receive professional help when dealing 
with personal problems that obstruct good functioning (Pulich and Tourigny, 
2004). Some deviant behaviors may be dealt with directly, e.g. by anger 
management programs or other types of correctional counseling. However, 
support may have a more indirect character, for instance when the employee is 
confronted with problems such as divorce, sickness or loss of a family member. 
Providing support may not only help the individual employee, but can also be of 
value to the organization by preventing escalation at work.  
8.5.10 Tactics and Innovations in Compliance 
Driven by regulatory crises, new visions and rulemaking experiments, scholars 
in law, sociology and political science have defined innovative forms of 
regulation at the (inter)national level (Schneiberg and Bartley, 2008; cf. Faure 
and Lefevere, 2005; cf. Zaelke et al., 2005). In the organizational sciences, 
however, daring and innovative new tactics seem to be few and far between (an 
obvious exception being the use of enabling IT to assess and control 
compliance, as described in the automatically assessing compliance and preven-
ting non-compliance tactics).  
At the (inter)national level, new and innovative forms of regulation may 
have one or several of the following characteristics (ibid.). First, although 
traditional schemes often relied on state agencies for regulation and enforce-
ment, new forms often also rely on non-state actors such as NGOs to act as 
watchdogs and assert pressure. Secondly, although regulation was traditionally 
used to suppress competition, some new forms have embraced it as a means to 
achieve regulatory goals. For example, tradable permit systems set a maximum 
level of allowed pollution, subsequently issue permits amounting to that level, 
and let firms choose their individual pollution levels by having them trade those 
permits. Thirdly, instead of detailed and universal prescriptions, new regulatory 
forms increasingly stimulate self-regulation of ‘regulated’ actors. For instance, 
those actors can define their own standards through collective dialogue. Such 
processes may be driven by state-defined high-level goals, but allow for 
individual freedom. Fourthly, whereas traditional forms made extensive use of 
formal sanctions in an enforcement approach, new forms often rely on 
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information-based schemes in which rating and ranking, naming and shaming, 
peer reviews and benchmarking, price-driven processes, and empowered non-
state actors play a crucial role. Sanctions are not an integral part of the 
regulation, nor are they administered by the state. Given actual transparency, 
rewards and penalties in such an approach are instead invoked decentrally by 
consumers, investors and advocacy groups in terms of products consumed, 
investments made and reputations defined. A California law, for example, 
resulted in improved behavior by forcing restaurants to display health inspection 
letter grades in their windows (Schneiberg and Bartley, 2008). 
Although we could not find them in the organizational sciences literature, 
the analogues (or translations) below can be defined as candidate tactics for 
internal compliance. They are marked with an asterisk in Figure 8.2.  
 Subjecting operations to third party scrutiny. If an organization sincerely 
strives to be in compliance, it may motivate its members by calling upon 
external parties. For instance, a large energy firm could provide an NGO 
with access to its plants in order to have operations scrutinized. This would 
not only ensure critical compliance assessments, but society’s knowledge of 
such an endeavor would also have positive effects on the company’s 
reputation. The involved parties should make strict agreements regarding 
public disclosure of the results, in order to allow the company sufficient time 
to address any violations. Another expected condition for this approach, in 
which external parties are granted access willingly, is that the firm be 
reasonably confident about receiving positive evaluations. 
 Using internal market logic. Competition can be introduced within an 
organization for obtaining compliance-related goals. For example, by letting 
multiple teams draft a proposal for a business project that has to implement 
or comply with e.g. regulations or internal IT standards. Management can 
subsequently decide which proposal offers the optimal solution, taking into 
account both business goals and policy constraints. Note that we positioned 
this tactic at the Collective level of the typology as a result of our example 
implementation. However, a spin-off version of this tactic could possibly be 
applicable at the Enterprise level. 
 Implementing self-regulation. Self-regulation could be implemented within 
the organization by an enterprise-wide policy containing high-level targets 
and abstract principles, allowing actors to conform to them by translating 
these principles to their own explicit and more detailed rules, according to 
local circumstances. It would be crucial that enterprise-wide regulators 
restrict themselves to guarding that local units conform to the high-level 
goals of the policy (e.g. selling mortgages ethically) and achieve its targets 
(e.g. having a tiny percentage of clients with difficulties paying off their 
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debts). This is a consequence of the self-regulation concept, using abstract 
principles and focusing on end goals. The internal regulators therefore 
cannot readily assess compliance with their principles, since these are too 
abstract and the norms that are sufficiently tangible for assessments are 
owned by the ‘regulatees’ (e.g. local offices). Opportunism and free riding 
are evident risks in a self-regulatory scheme. However, such risks may be 
relatively manageable within an organization by asserting internal pressure. 
The organization’s regulators would also be able to review and approve the 
self-written tangible local norms before implementation begins. Moreover, 
they would assess the achievement of the end goals. A wholly different 
approach to internal self-regulation would be to still create detailed rules at 
the enterprise level, but regularly rewrite them in cooperation with regulated 
actors as knowledge of and experience with applying those rules is build up.  
 Internal regulation by information. Regulation by information could be 
implemented by internally publishing information about actors’ compliance 
performance. For example, if compliance assessments of projects or units 
with internal IT standards are conducted, the results could be presented on 
the organization’s intranet or in a newsletter. As actors’ reputations are at 
stake, such disclosure may have a significant effect on compliance results, 
especially when the most important norms are widely accepted. Compliance 
reporting of individuals may be more difficult. However, conforming 
behavior may be communicated in a positive manner, including any bonuses 
these individuals may have received as a reward for it. This approach may 
not be a single tactic, but rather a mix of tactics drawn mainly from the 
Assessment column and may also be combined with self-regulation. Another 
option would be to completely dispense with creating explicit norms, as 
transparency could lead to the organizational community determining 
acceptable levels of behavior by itself. 
8.6 Discussion 
In this section we will discuss the results of our literature review. Subsection 
8.6.1 presents the general findings. Subsection 8.6.2 focuses on developing 
coherent compliance strategies, which is relevant because a fragmented set of 
tactics is not sufficient for effective compliance management. 
8.6.1 General findings 
We start our discussion with a short overview of each academic field’s 
contributions to this study. The fields of law and political science prove to have 
the most mature conceptualizations of compliance and related concepts. These 
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insights therefore figure largely in section 8.3. The reviewed literature in the 
field of philosophy was also used mainly for the foundational insights presented 
in that section. The organizational sciences – such as management, business 
studies, information systems and organizational sociology – were used mainly 
for the identification of tactics and insights into strategies. As stated in section 
8.5.10, except for IT-related solutions, the organizational sciences do not seem 
to report on many innovations and experiments in compliance. It is mainly the 
fields of law, sociology and political science that have described innovative 
forms of regulatory implementation at the (inter)national level. Translating them 
to the organizational domain, we have defined four analogues of innovative 
candidate tactics for internal compliance. 
Interestingly, during our literature study we practically did not find any 
publications presenting a general and comprehensive perspective on organi-
zational compliance strategies. Note that the compliance strategy item in Table 
8.3 does not refer to publications that put forward such rich conceptualizations 
of compliance strategies, but to publications that in some way present input for 
such a view (as such, they will be referenced in section 8.6.2 on strategies). 
Most publications presenting organizational compliance solutions do not focus 
on general insights into compliance strategies, but instead aim to make the case 
for a specific compliance view or approach, employing a selected set of tactics 
(e.g. Tyler and Blader, 2005; Weaver at al., 1999a; Panitz et al., 2010; Puha-
kainen and Siponen, 2010; Agrawal et al., 2006; Straub, 1990; Li et al., 2010; 
Boss et al. 2009; Namiri and Stojanovic, 2007; Foorthuis et al., 2010; Gover-
natori et al., 2006; Breaux et al., 2009; Peterson and Burns, 2006; Cuppens-
Boulahia and Cuppens, 2008; Straub and Welke, 1998; Racz et al., 2010; 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Kerrigan et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2007; Pahnila et al., 
2007). Although some publications do present a neutral, non-evaluative and 
broad overview of compliance tactics available, the number of identified tactics 
tends to be quite limited (Braganza and Franken, 2007; Pulich and Tourigny, 
2004; Weaver et al., 1999b; SIA, 2005). Moreover, only a limited number of 
publications have provided an integrated or high-level discussion on the concept 
of compliance strategies and programs (e.g. COSO, 1994; Luthy and Forcht, 
2006; Burgemeestre et al., 2009). Notable in this regard is Weaver’s et al. 
(1999a) view of ethics programs as organizational control systems. Such 
programs are characterized by a control orientation (enforcement versus 
management), have a scope in terms of formalization, specialization and 
hierarchy (in terms of e.g. ethics officers and staff), and consist of other 
elements such as the ethical codes of conduct, communication systems, training 
programs and disciplinary measures. However, Weaver et al. still present a 
limited number of tactics and focus only on formal initiatives. Furthermore, the 
bird’s-eye view of our literature study yielded insights that are quite distinct 
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from each other and sometimes even incompatible. A still broader 
conceptualization, allowing for all kinds of approaches, is therefore required. 
Section 8.6.2 aims to present such a rich conceptualization of compliance 
strategies.  
Another finding concerns cell volume. Figure 8.2 makes clear that the 
Assessment and especially Management columns are abundantly filled, whereas 
the Inducement and Enforcement columns do not contain as many tactics. This 
could be the result of the arbitrary nature of typologies and the subjectivity of 
the research. However, studying the assessment and management tactics in 
more detail makes clear that this is not the case. Many of these individual tactics 
– such as socialization of newcomers, selecting employees, facilitating commu-
nities of practice and reflecting on culture in terms of compliance – offer rich 
opportunities and choices when implementing them (see section 8.5 for details). 
In other words, the assessment and management tactics are not defined with 
finer granularity than their inducement and enforcement counterparts. Rather, it 
should be concluded that the assessment and management approaches offer a 
wider variety of ways for encouraging compliance. Another aspect concerns the 
vertical dimension, with the Enterprise level accommodating relatively many 
tactics. Note that the tactics at this level are not necessarily employed directly 
by senior managers, since gaining insight into enterprise-wide compliance rates 
and properly specifying policies, for example, will be executed by staff 
members. However, senior management should be aware of their responsibility 
to initiate tactics at this level. 
8.6.2 Moving From Compliance Tactics to Compliance Strategy 
In section 8.5 we have described a large number of compliance measures. 
Although this typology of tactics constitutes the core contribution of this 
chapter, a fragmented set of tactics is not sufficient for effective compliance 
management. Therefore, this section aims to present a rich conceptualization of 
compliance management strategies and discuss crucial aspects of developing 
such a coherent strategy. Not surprisingly, in most organizations it will first be 
necessary to put the compliance management function in place. This may 
encompass the installment of an independent audit and compliance department 
– including its officers and staff with clearly defined roles, responsibilities and 
authority (Gaunt, 1998; Weaver at al., 1999b; Arjoon, 2006; SIA, 2005). 
Depending on the situation, the scope of such initiatives tends to vary widely in 
terms of personnel and supporting structures (Weaver at al., 1999a; SIA, 2005). 
An important implementation aspect is the necessary separation of duties, so as 
to guarantee independent and objective assessments and audits (Solms, 2005; 
SIA, 2005). In addition, employees occupying relevant positions should be 
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provided with proper mandates, authorizations and authority (Agrawal et al., 
2006; Arjoon, 2006; COSO, 1994).  
A key responsibility of the compliance function is the development of a 
compliance management strategy. As stated, however, we did not find any 
publications presenting a general and all-encompassing perspective on organiza-
tional compliance strategies. The remainder of this section aims to present such 
a conceptualization. We will draw on the general strategy research of Mintzberg 
(1987) for this purpose. There are several reasons for using Mintzberg’s five 
views on strategy. First, the concept of organizational strategy is ambiguous and 
multifaceted (French, 2009), and Mintzberg’s comprehensive view also allow 
for perspectives on strategy that are incompatible for a given situation (e.g. a 
predefined plan versus a pattern discovered after the fact). Second, Mintzberg’s 
conceptualization is widely accepted. 
The most dominant view is that of strategy as a plan, a consciously intended 
course of action. The compliance strategy here is therefore developed 
purposefully and in advance of execution. Goal-setting will be an important 
element (Quinn, 1996), especially regarding the level and nature of compliance 
with policies in question. Note that striving for a 100% compliance level may 
not only be unrealistic, but could also yield unwanted side-effects. The 
organization would run an increased risk of developing a bureaucratic culture of 
‘overconformity’. Adherence to the rules would then become an end in itself 
rather than aim at achieving goals, resulting in rigidity and an inability to adjust 
to individual cases (Merton, 1957). Employees will consequently hide behind 
the rules and absolve themselves from any responsibility. In addition, a strong 
focus on compliance and monitoring may lead to a ‘surveillance culture’, 
distrust, a distinction between ‘them’ (i.e. the compliance officers) and ‘us’, a 
lack of commitment and even resistance (Tyler and Blader, 2005; Currie, 2008; 
Short and Toffel, 2010). As has been suggested in political science, an 
acceptable level of overall compliance may therefore be better than a standard 
of strict compliance (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). The organization may only be 
able to choose such levels in the case of standards and internal procedures, 
whereas in the case of laws and regulations full compliance is required. Even 
regarding regulatory compliance choices have to be made, however, as it may 
be possible and desirable to move “beyond compliance” and do more than 
strictly necessary (Short and Toffel, 2010). Organizations have on the other 
hand also been known to merely act as symbolic compliers, instead of taking 
substantive action (see below). In addition to determining the degree of 
compliance, it should also be decided for each policy how to comply. 
Organizations often have some leeway as to the exact nature of achieving 
compliance goals, even with external norms (Philippe and Durand, 2011). For 
example, organizations can comply with transparency laws (e.g. disclosing their 
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investments) but refuse to conform to underlying norms and values of ethical 
business (and e.g. continue their investments in the weapons industry). In 
addition to goal-setting, more mundane decisions have to be made regarding 
budget. Pursuing a rationalistic command-and-control approach, with a heavy 
focus on monitoring and enforcement, is a very expensive road to travel (Tyler 
and Blader, 2005). In addition to budget, time is also an important aspect. 
Although strategy is not associated with short-term thinking, setting out to 
change the organization’s compliance culture, for example, may require an 
extensive and long-term change initiative with repeating reinforcement of 
norms and an uncertain outcome (Gaunt, 1998; Ogbonna and Harris, 1998). The 
combination of compliance goals and available time and budget may require 
goal prioritizing. Schraaf (2005) describes a 2x2 matrix for setting priorities on 
the basis of the dimensions risk (in terms of negative impact) and non-
compliance rate. Issues with both a high risk (e.g. high fines) and high internal 
non-compliance rate receive the highest priority.  
The second view of strategy is that as perspective, a way of perceiving the 
world. This is strongly related to the organization’s worldview, culture and 
‘character’. An important aspect here is that strategy is a shared perspective, 
part of the organization’s collective mind. Especially relevant in our context is 
what view the organization has regarding the nature of compliance. What 
account does it have of why its units, projects and employees comply or do not 
comply with policies? Are organizational actors rational agents calculating the 
benefits and costs of compliance decisions or are they good-faith actors valuing 
their identity and in need of effective means and knowledge? Or is the 
worldview a combination of both? This perspective, whether conscious or not, 
will guide strategic and day-to-day compliance decisions.  
A third view is strategy as a ploy, a maneuver to outwit a competitor or 
opponent. In terms of compliance, the organization may try to attract investors 
by being the first to adhere to the new rules of Sarbanes-Oxley or the Basel 
accords, or to innovative industrial standards. In contrast, the organization may 
also choose to lower compliance levels temporarily in order to achieve a 
strategic and highly visible business result. A ploy in the context of compliance 
could also be taken to mean obfuscating non-compliance (Heyes, 2000) and 
conducting mainly symbolic compliance activities (Short and Stoffel, 2010; 
Weaver et al., 1999b; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Such symbolic compliance 
refers to the concept of decoupling policy from practice, a form of window-
dressing in which an insignificant compliance program is implemented. Such 
programs are ineffective because they are disconnected, i.e. the organization 
avoids their crucial elements – such as monitoring and punishing – being 
integrated into the central, task-related business activities. This results in non-
compliance, as processes are not continuously monitored for compliance, 
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processes are not seriously affected by the program, and transgressors are not 
confronted with disciplinary measures. However, to the outside world public 
claims are made about significant compliance efforts and the organization being 
in compliance. Research has shown that organizations may get away with 
decoupling, but that this can also lead to severe financial and reputational 
damage (MacLean and Behnam, 2010). As stated earlier, in this chapter we will 
assume an organization genuinely strives to be compliant.  
A fourth view sees strategy as a position, a means of locating an orga-
nization in its environment and a mediating force between the organization and 
its external context. The compliance strategy in this view is used to position the 
enterprise in the market, for customers and other stakeholders, and in terms of 
which ethical principles to adhere to (and to what degree). It should also be 
decided which professional standards and quality norms to comply with, and 
which to demand from e.g. suppliers. This also points to the fact that the 
organization has an active relationship with its environment and should 
determine whether or not to try and influence external regulators’ policy making 
processes (cf. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Schneiberg and Bartley, 2008). Indeed, 
one painless way to be compliant is to ensure newly devised norms are 
consistent with existing behavior (Downs et al., 1996). Apart from this external 
orientation, the compliance strategy should also be positioned internally. It 
should, in other words, be aligned with the overall business strategy and with 
the core beliefs and values of the organizational culture. In this regard, senior 
management should make clear what the purpose of the organization is. Purpose 
could be regarded as the statement of an organization’s moral response to its 
broader defined responsibilities, not as an amoral plan for exploiting 
commercial opportunities (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1994). Several questions 
should also be considered regarding the ambitions of integration. One question 
concerns whether holistic compliance is desirable (Volonino et al., 2004; 
Cleven and Winter, 2009; Panitz et al., 2010), i.e. the extent to which com-
pliance management intends to deliver central and integrated (instead of 
fragmented) compliance efforts, covers multiple internal and external policies, 
and has a long-term scope. Another issue is that it should be decided whether 
compliance management itself should be integrated with enterprise risk 
management and overall governance efforts (Dawson, 2008). As described in a 
previous section, integrated, holistic compliance may yield improved insights, 
which can be used for increasing consistency and reducing complexity of 
processes and systems. 
When strategy is seen as a pattern, the focus lies on the pattern that can be 
observed in a stream of actions. This fifth view focuses on two important 
aspects of compliance strategies. The first is that strategy as a plan is neither 
sufficient nor necessary, as there should be actual behavior in the form of 
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decisions and actions. In our context this implies that day-to-day business 
processes are not decoupled and shielded from, but actually integrated with and 
affected by compliance-related considerations (MacLean and Behnam, 2010). 
The use of informal tactics may also be more immanent in these day-to-day 
behaviors than in predefined plans. A second important aspect is that of 
coherency in those decisions and actions (Mintzberg, 1987; Quinn, 1996). A 
compliance strategy should focus on the interdependence and internal con-
sistency of goals, planned action and actual conduct. Moreover, and arguably 
the most crucial part in the context of this study, a compliance strategy should 
encompass one or more coherent sets of tactics aimed at achieving a targeted 
compliance level. The framework and typology presented in section 8.4 can be 
used to predefine (or analyze in retrospect) such sets. Given the fact that the 
typology is the core contribution of this chapter, it is this aspect that is 
especially interesting here. The remainder of this section will therefore focus on 
the factors involved in creating these intervention mixes, i.e. relevant and 
coherent combinations of compliance tactics.  
 
In general, a strategy drawing its tactics from both the rationalist and 
normative perspective seems to be the most promising approach (Grossman and 
Zaelke, 2005; Wasserman, 2009; Tyler and Blader, 2005; Short and Toffel, 
2010; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Braithwaite, 2007). From the rationalist 
model, especially enforcement is often seen as a necessary element. According 
to Grossman and Zaelke (2005, p. 78), for example, the “proper balance of the 
two models thus seems to be a compliance enforcement system that also 
encourages the norms and incentives that lead to voluntary compliance, while 
maintaining the bedrock foundation of enforcement and deterrence to alter the 
calculations of those less inclined to voluntarily comply.” In terms of the 
framework of section 8.4 this means minimally picking tactics from both the 
Enforcement and Management columns.  
However, a compliance strategy is heavily contingent upon the situation. 
Most fundamentally, the choice of which exact combination of tactics to include 
depends strongly on whether a rationalistic or normative orientation weighs 
more heavily. In this context, several strategies or “modes” can be identified 
(Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2003). For example, a primarily rational 
“compliance mode” would focus on formalizing norms, monitoring compliance-
performance and sanctioning of transgressions. Tactics would be drawn mostly 
from the Enforcement and Assessment columns. A primarily normative 
“integrity mode” would focus on reflecting on the culture, top management 
support, internalization of values, providing assistance and other forms of 
managing non-compliance. Tactics would thus be chosen mostly from the 
Management and Assessment columns. Note that the choice of such a mode or 
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strategy depends not only on ambitions, but even more so on the starting point, 
i.e. the current compliance culture, routines and context of the organization 
(ibid.; Short and Toffel, 2010). As stated in the previous section, it should also 
be noted in this context that the Management and Assessment columns offer a 
wider variety of tactics, and thus more opportunities for tailoring the strategy to 
the specific setting. 
However, it is too simplistic to presume that a single combination of tactics 
in the strategy is sufficient. It may very well be necessary to define intervention 
mixes at a lower level. For example, each reason for non-compliance may have 
its own set of tactics, as does each type of actor (Schraaf, 2005). In addition, 
each geographical establishment may have its own unique intervention mix, 
since organizational cultures and legal requirements differ between locations 
(cf. Arjoon, 2006). Furthermore, different policies may require different sets of 
compliance tactics, as compliance with internal standards presumably allows 
more discretion than compliance with mandatory external legislation. Internal 
regulators should also think about how to sequence or escalate the use of tactics 
for distinct types of situations. An approach known as ‘responsive regulation’ 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2007) states that in most cases 
regulatees do not have to be coerced into complying and can be persuaded 
through e.g. explanation and education. However, for actors demonstrating 
increasing (risk of) non-compliance, an escalation path can be followed with 
increasingly intrusive and coercive measures taken. Such an approach, 
therefore, differentiates between different types of actors, risks or behavior, and 
deals with each accordingly. It is exactly the perception that a regulator can and 
if necessary will resort to varying degrees of tougher enforcement tactics that 
allows him to be ‘soft’ to most actors most of the time. Such a strategy could 
then draw its tactics from all columns of the framework. For some actors 
management tactics would suffice, whereas for others a combination of 
enforcement and assessment tactics would be necessary. It should be noted, 
however, that a compliance strategy should not try to include as many tactics as 
possible, as an effective strategy generally develops around a limited number of 
key ideas (Quinn, 1996).  
Within a given mix of tactics, specific organizational traits such as power 
relationships and culture determine how best to deploy and use them. In short, 
the exact set of intervention mixes and their usage are contingent upon the 
specific characteristics of the enterprise in question (Schraaf, 2005; cf. SIA, 
2005; cf. Arjoon, 2006; cf. Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). Consequently, 
devising a compliance strategy is also a creative endeavor inspired by the 
organization’s unique situation, not simply a matter of mechanically following a 
simple method.  
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National and organizational culture can be important factors in deciding on 
which levels to draw tactics from. An individualistic culture – emphasizing 
freedom, creativity and individual responsibility and autonomy – will be more 
likely to think in terms of individuals complying with norms (cf. Bond and 
Smith, 1996; Ralston et al., 1997; Goncalo and Staw, 2006). Such a culture can 
thus be expected to yield a strategy with relatively many tactics from the indi-
vidual level, as individual employees and their individual managers will be held 
responsible for conforming to the (mandatory) norms. On the other hand, a 
collectivistic culture – placing more emphasis on organizational identity, 
collaboration, a shared vision, a consistent reputation and solidarity – will be 
more likely to focus on group conformity (ibid.). General compliance levels 
may be higher in such a culture, but the compliance ambitions may likewise be 
higher. Therefore, when the organization is faced with unsatisfactory com-
pliance levels, a collectivistic culture can be expected to employ tactics from the 
collective and enterprise levels. Note that this would not make tactics at the 
individual level superfluous, as measures at the enterprise level (e.g. developing 
guidelines for punishing and mandating compliance officers to provide incen-
tives) often imply the availability of tactics at the individual level (e.g. imposing 
formal penalties and offering formal rewards). In both types of culture the focus 
of the compliance strategy may shift as time progresses. A strategy drawing 
heavily on tactics from the individual level may go hand in hand with an 
increasing employee experience of unfairness, since colleagues may be 
rewarded or punished very differently for quite similar behavior (cf. Li et al., 
2010). In time, the organization may find itself forced to develop enterprise-
wide guidelines for punishing and rewarding. 
8.7 Conclusions and further research 
Our research constitutes a high-level and comprehensive view on the topic of 
internal compliance. We did not come across any publications in the organiza-
tional sciences with a similar broad scope and distanced view, acknowledging 
the value of all possible approaches. Most research instead focuses on the 
development of a compliance strategy or program from a specific perspective, 
with a limited set of tactics deemed superior. Such research thus presents spe-
cific instances of approaches and strategies, whereas our aim of this study was 
to take a more high-level perspective to provide a neutral and complete 
overview of generic ways to bring the organization into compliance. It is 
possible to analyze and position these tactics using the overall framework and 
typology presented in this chapter. This study has put forward rich con-
ceptualizations of both compliance tactics and compliance strategies. Concep-
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tualizing internal compliance in terms of tactics and strategies also allows for a 
purer view on the topic than the standard view of internal controls does. 
Because of the bird’s-eye view of this study, our conceptualizations are also 
presented neutrally and non-evaluative, thus without making the case for 
specific, superior approaches.  
The core contribution of this chapter is the typology of 45 generic 
compliance tactics, the development of which has been based on a large 
interdisciplinary literature review of 134 publications drawing from both 
classical and state-of-the-art insights. To the best of our knowledge, such an 
overview has not been published before and this study thus fills a gap in the 
literature on internal compliance. Focusing on compliance tactics (rather than 
on internal controls) ensures we have captured the substantive essence instead 
of implementation activities. The resulting overview of tactics can be used as a 
reference work and inspirational resource by both practitioners and academics. 
A second contribution is the multidisciplinary overview of core insights 
presented in section 8.3, resulting in the development of the two-dimensional 
framework of section 8.4. The cells of this framework can be used for 
positioning and characterizing compliance tactics (resulting in the typology, i.e. 
Figure 8.2). The framework as a whole can also be used for describing and 
developing coherent and balanced compliance strategies. In this context, a third 
contribution is the broad and all-encompassing conceptualization of a com-
pliance management strategy and the overview of crucial aspects of developing 
one. More in general, this chapter serves as an overview of fundamental insights 
into the topic of compliance, for academics and practitioners on the one hand, 
and for newcomers and knowledgeable professionals on the other.  
Several limitations should be mentioned. As stated in section 8.4, a draw-
back of typologies is that their exhaustiveness cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, 
since we have chosen to draw from multiple disciplines, a huge number of 
publications on compliance could potentially be reviewed and not all of these 
could possibly be included in our review. As a consequence, we cannot 
guarantee that we have identified all existing tactics. To deal with this issue, 
however, we continued reviewing up to the point that the inventory of tactics 
was saturated, no new tactics were found, and new publications only served to 
support existing tactics. A second limitation, and another known drawback of 
typologies, is that mutual exclusiveness of the identified types cannot be 
guaranteed. We have dealt with this problem by mentioning explicitly when 
certain compliance tactics are related or overlapping. A third limitation is that 
the reviews were conducted by the principal researcher only. This has the 
advantage that it lowers the risk of inconsistent reviews. However, a drawback 
is that the definition of tactics will be more prone to an individual’s subjectivity.  
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This risk was mitigated by regularly discussing the defined tactics with co-
authors and other colleagues. In this context it should also be noted that the 
concepts of tactics and strategies have no absolute meaning in themselves and 
are inherently flexible, regardless of the research approach (Mintzberg, 1987). 
The typology of tactics and the broad view on compliance management 
strategies may serve as a foundation for further research. A first opportunity for 
future research is putting the innovative candidate tactics to practice, for 
example by employing an action research approach. A second suggestion for 
further study is to verify whether individualistic cultures indeed mainly use 
individual level tactics, whereas collectivistic cultures also put enterprise and 
collective level tactics to use. As far as we know, this topic has not yet been 
studied. A third avenue for future research is to investigate more deeply how to 
develop a compliance management strategy, given the large amount of tactics 
available. For example, the elementary tactics in the typology can be used as 
input for studying opportunities for new and innovative strategic intervention 
mixes. In the process, more tactics may also be discovered or devised, not only 
because new ideas may drive innovation, but also because of the fact that 
certain cells of the framework are not filled as abundantly as others. A final area 
for further study is the development of additional theoretical perspectives on 
compliance strategies, using Mintzberg’s five views or other conceptualizations. 
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Appendix 8.A. Review protocol 
 
 
Research questions 
 What are the fundamental concepts in compliance?  
 How can compliance tactics be classified? 
 What tactics for stimulating compliance are acknowledged in 
the literature? 
 How can compliance tactics be integrated in a compliance 
management strategy? 
 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Inclusion criteria compliance tactics: 
 Preferably academic (operationalized as at least one of the 
authors affiliated with a university at the time of writing) 
and peer reviewed. 
 Non-peer reviewed (technical report). 
 Non-peer reviewed and non-academic (practitioner publication). 
This is only permitted if the publication has a unique 
contribution to the research. 
 English or Dutch (preferably English). 
 The final decision on whether to review the publication is 
made on the basis of title, abstract and, if useful, 
conclusions and scanning through the publication. 
 Papers in which compliance is the core topic are preferred, 
but this is no strict criterion. 
 
Exclusion criteria compliance tactics: 
 Publications that are neither in English nor in Dutch.  
 
Steps in a review of a publication 
Directly after reading the publication, two actions are undertaken.  
 An entry is added to the literature database (see below).  
 Relevant passages from the publication are captured in the 
first-codes-document (first-coding). A name (first code, 
representing a tactic name) is attached to it in the process. 
Text can be paraphrased or copy-and-pasted from the 
publication. These first-code texts can later be used as input 
for the pattern-coding process. 
 If the publication contains knowledge relevant to the topic of 
compliance management strategy, relevant text is copied-and-
pasted to the strategy section of the first-codes-document. 
 If the pattern-coding process has already been started, the 
relevant pattern code(s) is (are) created or updated. 
Important criteria for defining a definitive pattern code 
(i.e. tactic) are mutual exclusiveness and a conceptual 
abstraction that allows for a clear and presentable 
description of the code. 
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Literature database 
Directly after reviewing a publication, a relevant description of it 
is stored in the literature database. The following information is 
stored. 
 ID: Number assigned automatically (primary key). 
 Title: Title of the reviewed publication. 
 Authors: Authors of the reviewed publication. 
 Year: Year that the reviewed publication was published. 
 Source: Journal, conference, etc in which the reviewed 
publication is published. 
 Date entered: Date that this record is entered (and, in 
principle, that the publication is reviewed). 
 Classification: Academic peer-reviewed, academic non-peer 
reviewed, or non-peer reviewed non-academic. If the 
classification is ‘non-peer reviewed non-academic’, then the 
Remarks section should explain the value of the publication. 
 Discipline: Information Systems, Business, Law, Philosophy, 
Psychology. 
 Core topics: The relevancy to one or more of our core topics. 
In other words, whether the publication explicitly covers: 
o Compliance as a concept (mainly for the definitions and 
framework) 
o Compliance tactics (for identifying tactics and filling 
of the framework) 
o Compliance strategy concept (for knowledge on creating 
strategy based on framework) 
 Research question: The question or aim of the reviewed 
publication. 
 Contribution: Free format text mentioning the contribution of 
the publication to our research. 
 InDefinitiveSet: Whether the publication is included in the 
definitive set of relevant publications, and likely to be 
referenced in the final publication. Can also be Null (i.e. 
not yet decided). 
 Unit of Analysis: Individual (e.g. Psychological research), 
Collective (teams, projects and departments within an 
organization), Organization (enterprise-wide), Nation (also 
multiple nations, i.e. an international scope). 
 Quality evaluation: Subjective remarks concerning the quality 
of the study. Value are “Good”, “Medium”, “Inadequate”. 
 Remarks: Any other remarks, for example what significant 
contribution a non-peer reviewed non-academic offers (e.g. 
providing a unique insight or a clarifying illustration of a 
tactic in practice). 
 
Other remarks 
A publication can be relevant to more than one of our core topics. 
A publication can have multiple levels of analysis, depending on the 
concept.  
An academic book is considered to be peer-reviewed. 
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Appendix 8.B. Screenshot of Literature Database 
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Appendix 8.C. Coding Traceability 
 
Coding traceability 
First order codes Pattern codes 
 
Detection strategies: assessing compliance 
 
Ensure optimal prescriptions 
 
Explain rationale 
 
Specify 
 
Communication 
 
Providing technical and financial assistance 
 
Increasing cooperation and explaining the rules 
 
Prevention 
 
Chaperoning 
 
Information systems for monitoring,  
reporting and auditing 
 
Rewarding key employees 
 
Give prestigious assignments to adherents 
 
Gathering knowledge 
 
Creating a central repository 
 
Mandating innovations 
 
 
 
Disincentives: penalties 
 
 
 
Coercive measures 
 
Performance feedback 
 
Put controls in place 
 
Psychological contract 
 
Organizational support for individuals 
 
Celebrate successes 
 
Fairness 
 
Interactive reflection on current state 
 
Understanding non-compliance 
 
Example setting 
 
Management propagation 
 
Internal compliance through external compliance 
 
Make sure one has good personal relationships 
 
Understanding and empowering key actors 
 
Building political will and expanding funding 
 
Understanding and using internal relationships 
 
Building capacity of regulators and those they regulate 
 
Utilizing social psychological mechanisms 
 
Self-reporting 
 
Covering/paying for IT expenses 
 
 
 
Manually assessing compliance 
 
Automatically assessing compliance 
 
Auditing the compliance function 
 
Properly specifying policies 
 
Actively disseminating policies 
 
Providing assistance 
 
 
 
Preventing non-compliance 
 
 
Using IT-systems for storing and  
managing auditable information 
 
Gaining insight into enterprise-wide compliance rates 
 
Offering formal rewards 
 
Offering social rewards 
 
Offering professional rewards 
 
Gathering and creating knowledge 
 
Rejecting the project deliverable 
 
Terminating the project 
 
Imposing social penalties 
 
Mandating compliance officers to provide (dis)incentives 
 
Imposing formal penalties 
 
Providing performance feedback 
 
 
Signing an agreement 
 
 
Providing organizational support 
 
Celebrating successes 
 
Developing guidelines for rewarding and punishing 
 
Reflecting on culture in terms of compliance 
 
Making examples out of non-compliers 
 
Ensuring management support 
 
 
 
Creating internal commitment by external justification 
 
 
 
 
 
Understanding and using social structures 
 
 
 
 
 
Employing social psychological mechanisms 
 
Using self-reporting 
 
Funding compliance-unrelated expenses  
 
Providing political support for other initiatives 
 
 
Compensating costs 
 
Financial transfers 
 
Training 
 
Hire knowledgeable employees 
 
Knowledge dissemination through secondment 
 
Hiring employees with congruent values 
 
Socialization of newcomers 
 
Whistle-blower hotline 
 
Organized knowledge exchange 
 
Compensating for compliance costs 
 
 
Training compliance assessors 
 
Training compliance-targets 
 
 
Selecting compatible and knowledgeable employees 
 
 
 
Socialization of newcomers 
 
Installing a whistle-blower hotline 
 
Facilitating communities of practice 
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